While philosophical speculation into the nature and value of emotions is at least as old as the Pre-Socratics, William James' "What is an emotion?" reinvigorated interest in the question. Coming to grips with James' proposals, particularly in the light of subsequent concerns for the difficulties inherent in a so-called private language, led philosophers away from analyses centred on feelings to ones centred on thoughts. Analyzing the emotions in this way involves returning to a vision of the emotions that traces its (...) ancestry back to the Stoics, but has proven to be enormously insightful and influential again in modern times. The papers collected here centre on James' question and often respond explicitly to one another. Together, they provide a sense of what a cognitive view of the emotions maintains, what it denies, and how it has arisen. The connection provides wide-ranging coverage of the point of dispute amongst those impressed by the cognitive approach, and gives a good sense too of the tremendous explanatory power of this view. (shrink)

This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle’s account of anger yields a narcissistic passion bedevilled by illusions of self-sufficiency. The paper argues on behalf of Aristotle’s valuing of anger within a virtuous and flourishing life, showing that and why Aristotle’s account is neither narcissistic nor involves illusions of self-sufficiency. In so arguing a deeper appreciation of Aristotle’s understanding of a self-sufficient life is reached, as are some interesting contrasts between Aristotle's understanding of anger, its (...) connections to value and our own understanding of these matters. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Rhetoric's Conception of the Passions Persuasion and the Passions Rousing the Passions Tactics The Legitimacy of the Passions Notes Bibliography.

This paper was originally presented at a Conference held at the University of Texas at Austin, part of a celebration of the career of Doug Browning.

The present study considers whether poetry is capable of providing insight that can illuminate our lives, doing so from the perspective of Aristotle’s understanding of tragedy, fear, and the emotions more generally. It argues that and explains how fear as understood by Aristotle can foster insight in a tragedy’s audience, depicts the nature and the bases for such insight, and suggests several ways in which insight that fear can bring to tragedy can be especially or particularly illuminating. The argument for (...) these conclusions proceeds by considering Aristotle’s understanding of fear, noting particularly its epistemological powers. It then turns to fear’s realization in response to tragedy, arguing that and explaining how tragedy’s form and a number of its distinctive features can shape fear in ways that more readily foster insight than is to be found in fear felt in more ordinary circumstances. The conclusion reached is that on Aristotle’s understanding fear in response to tragedy can prove particularly illuminating, and can illuminate our ordinary lives. (shrink)